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A Picture is Worth a Thousand Words
If a picture is worth a thousand words then applying this old adage to the topic at hand begs the question ... does the Common Operational Picture (COP) articulate the same thousand words to each observer? It is my thesis that the Common Operational Picture is a valuable tool with which to gain situational awareness of the battlespace, however it is only a snapshot of data and is subject to varied interpretations based on the perspectives of the observers. The further an observer is removed from the process of developing the COP (tactical, operational, strategic level of command) the greater the chance of misinterpreting the snapshot. Additionally, the varied responsibilities at each level of the chain of command will cause each level to display the COP differently based on the relevance of the data with regard to the commands responsibilities. The result is the potential for non-common understanding of the battlespace.
In pondering this issue it is useful to consider a lesson on observation and perception taught in basic psychology. Several people are tasked to observe a party then describe it.
After observing the same party each person describes a very different scene. One thinks the music is too loud and therefore describes an obnoxious party; another focuses on a couple having an argument and describes a party with negative vibes. A third observer sees people laughing on the dance floor and describes a fun party. Each person's perception of the party was determined by what he happened to focus on, and how he categorized that information based on past experience, as well as motivational, personal, and social factors 1 .
From the lesson above it is reasonable to conclude that the operational commander should exercise caution in assuming accuracy and assigning relevance to the operational picture 2 . The commander must realize that what is relevant at the operational level is not necessarily relevant at the tactical level where the data that feeds the COP is being developed. The divergence in relevance becomes more pronounced as the information being observed approaches real time and begins to look more like a tactical picture.
Because the COP is not really a picture, but rather a pictorial depiction of data that can be manipulated by the user, the users' experience with the battlespace combined with their current level of responsibility (strategic, operational, tactical) will drive what the observer chooses to display on their COP and how that display is interpreted. Let us suppose that a common data base data is achievable and let us refer to this data as the Common Tactical Picture (CTP). 4 The Common Tactical Picture, as the name implies, is created at the tactical level by operators with a high degree of experience with the data contained in the CTP, and with data not allowed into the CTP. To form a COP, data from multiple CTPs are correlated and fused together creating a new data base that is used to build the COP. To bring the various CTPs together is no small task and the lack of a cohesive information technology community in the military creates a situation in which the COP is not of sufficient accuracy for the operational commander to make effective decisions.
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Moreover, lack of familiarity with the data in the COP (even though it may be perfect) makes it less likely that the operational level of command will be able to go beyond the data and extrapolate meaning beyond the data (knowledge).
6
If one accepts that data is nothing more than facts, then it is of little use without the context that comes from personal understanding of how the data was developed and where it came from. It is important to point out that not all available data is allowed onto the CTP, nor is all data from the various CTPs allowed onto the COP. Operators at the tactical level realize this, however, the absence of information managers at the COP level creates a situation where the COP is not well understood and may lead to the dangerous illusion that the COP has enough fidelity for the operational commander to take over tactical control and direct specific engagements. Although the operational commander may need to assume tactical control in some instances, his staff is too far removed from the data to provide adequate context and the lack of an information management staff at the operational level forces that commander into a situation where he is reacting to data rather than exercising command and control based on a common understanding and knowledge of the battlespace.
The objective in developing the CTP and subsequently the COP is to turn plentiful raw data 
Is a Common Data Base Possible?
To delve into the issue of common pictures I consider two conceptual frameworks that describe a vision of information sharing that, among other things, will lead to a COP: 1) the Network Centric Warfare approach, and 2) the Systems of Systems approach. To discuss the likelihood of common understanding of the battlespace I consider the differences between knowledge and data and the effects of the human condition on interpretation of data. 
Network Centric Warfare
Vice Admiral Arthur K. Cebrowski, USN (Ret) and John Garstka describe Network Centric Warfare (NCW) in terms of a business model that has "emerged in the modern economy" in which information technology plays a central role. 8 The fundamental theme is that the military will transform its capabilities by switching from "platform centric" to "network centric" warfare. Cebrowski makes a compelling argument for this shift by describing NCW's worth to the military in terms of Metcalfe's Law. Thus "Network-centric computing is governed by Metcalfe's Law, which asserts that the 'power' of a network is proportional to the square of the number of nodes in the network." 9 The implication is that networking military computers and combat systems will produce an exponential increase in computing power, ultimately rendering a COP possible.
The information superiority derived from network-centric warfare hypothetically makes possible transformational capabilities such as massing of effects rather than massing of forces (presumably to achieve those same effects). An additional assertion of NCW proponents is that the complexity of warfare is best addressed by a bottom-up organization.
NCW enables this by providing lower echelons with an enhanced level of situational awareness allowing them to "self-synchronize" complex warfare activities.
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Let us assume that NCW will lead to a COP. However, it is appropriate to point out that many challenges to the validity of the NCW business model exist. One argues that NCW proponents misuse Metcalfe's Law by asserting that the military gains "power from the interactions" on the network, whereas Metcalfe's Law actually assigns "value to the network." 11 Additionally, NCW proponents assert that it will create an environment supportive of the concept of decentralized execution. The argument made is that lower echelons will be empowered with information previously only available at the operational level. The problem with this argument is that it treats the information flow as a one-way street with the benefactors of increased data traffic being lower echelons. However, it is actually a two-way street where the operational-level staffs will have increased access to perishable tactical data and may be tempted to inject themselves into tactical level decision making.
System of Systems
This conceptual framework resembles NCW in its emphasis that a Revolution in Owens believes that for a Revolution in Military Affairs to occur, and subsequently affect the acquisition process, a unified command structure is necessary to remove service oriented prioritization for weapons and equipment research and procurement leading to a "truly joint decision-making process for research and development priorities, and all procurement decision." 13 Owens further describes a command chain that would be flattened and remove intermediate layers of bureaucracy. Powerful networks could produce a COP in a centralized fashion then relay critical battlespace information and commands directly from leaders to combatants. 14 As with NCW, it is not difficult to envision a flattened command chain leading to a tendency towards centralized execution as operational commanders are presented with more and more real time information and have the capability to communicate with tactical units From a technology acquisition perspective it remains unclear how either NCW or system of systems proposes to implement its concepts, which is no small matter. Within the DoD a serious debate is underway, at the ones and zeros level, regarding how 13 Ibid., p. 203. 14 Ibid., p. 205.
"interoperability" will be achieved, thus enabling either concept. While the debate bogs down in technical issues such as whether interoperability should occur at the data layer versus the application layer ("thin client" versus "thick client") the fundamental issue hidden in the jargon is to what degree will platforms be able to process data autonomously in the event of failure of the network or isolation of a participant from the network. Both NCW and system of system proponents advocate decentralized command. Considering the level of autonomy each concept produces offers insights into how much advocacy each concept gives to decentralized command. The level of advocacy is discussed later.
How is the COP developed today?
Two Networks Operations Manual devotes more attention to the process of getting the data that is used to develop the Common Operational Picture. Because of the differences in where data comes from, the GCCS COP is not the same as the COP developed using the process outlined in the JDN Operations Manual. This text will expand on the JDN method since the COP produced using this method is closer to real time and in architecture more closely resembles the COP as NCW and system of systems would develop it.
The COP is developed by correlating and fusing data from multiple dissimilar data sources such as tactical data links, intelligence systems, sensor networks and ground networks. Currently, tactical data links provide the bulk of data that constitutes the COP.
While tactical data links do provide the commander with large amounts of data, the data is often provided by multiple overlapping sensor systems and data links are not capable of automatically managing redundant and erroneous data and fusing it into a COP. The result is that the best situational awareness resides at those levels of command which operate the ISR systems that develop the data and have enough familiarity with the data to extrapolate knowledge.
Eliminating propagation of faulty and redundant data across sub-networks and preventing faulty data from entering the COP "requires extensive cross-checking and filtering, driving up the information processing burden. 
Discipline -Where technology, the COP and Acquisition cross paths
The success of the JDN doctrine, which prescribes data management discipline, causes one to consider just why it took nearly two decades to realize that information technology systems like tactical data links require doctrine, organization, training and personnel to realize their potential.
In the world of information technology and C4ISR there is a prevailing lack of discipline in acquisition and implementation of systems. The tendency is to build high technology equipment then find an existing combat system to parse it into; leaving someone NATOPs manual is said to be written in blood since it was created as a result of grotesque losses of naval aviators during the Vietnam War. The C4ISR mission has no such manual, and has had no Vietnam-like event to motivate the military to increase discipline in this arena.
The Joint Data Networks Operations Manual addresses other networks in addition to
tactical data links that contribute to the Common Operational Picture; however, management of these networks and subsequent fusing of data into a COP are not clearly discussed, resulting in a COP that is largely comprised of data from tactical data links. The implication is that additional organizational changes are needed for the commander's COP to gain access to usable data from these other networks (intelligence, netted-sensors, ground networks, etc).
In the absence of organizational change these other networks will either not be displayed to the commander, they will have to be manually entered, or they will be displayed on a stand-alone system. Either way the data will not be fused into a COP. Each functional commander could be staffed with information managers and tasked with creating an operational architecture and managing the CTP for their area of responsibility. The Combatant Commander or Joint Task Force staff could then draw upon the various resource spheres to develop the COP. Such an arrangement could provide the organizational structure required to manage data in a disciplined manner that could lead to knowledge on which the commander might act.
Impact on Command and Control
An important C2 consideration is to establish an understanding of the boundaries of where the COP is common and at what point in the chain of command (tactical, operational, strategic) does display of the COP become sufficiently different that it would be imprudent for that level of command to exercise direct authority. In other words, when is the chain of command too flat?
Consider a homeland defense system that can provide a perfect COP from the tactical level all the way to the President. Remember that the COP is not a "view only" common picture, but rather common data that can be manipulated through various filters for display based on the user's needs. Now consider a chain of command from an F-16, to a JFACC, to
Commander NORAD Region, to NORAD, to the President. Each operator in this chain represents a different level of command, with different responsibilities and perspectives, and has different display needs to provide the situational awareness required to fulfill his responsibilities. Consider an extreme case in which responsibility and perspective might lead to vastly different COPs and, therefore, different perspectives and interpretations of the COP. closeness to the source of information. In this instance the tactical, operational and strategic levels of command interpreted the "picture" differently and came to different conclusions about how to proceed.
What is the likelihood that the F-16 pilot and the Commander-in-Chief

The Information Pie: Global versus Local Sensors
A study conducted by Project AIR FORCE, the Air Force Federally Funded Research and Development Center (FFRDC), provides cogent analysis of the significance of who creates or provides data and subsequently how that data should be treated from a COP management perspective. 20 Two approaches to dividing information were considered "based on where the raw data comes from." 21 One approach is sensor-centric in which information systems are built around the sensor. Such a system would have its own tools to command and control sensors and provide interoperable data to users over the Global Information Grid (GIG). A second approach is mission-centric information systems where data may be drawn from global and local sensors and command and control could be in the field, at the JTF, or in CONUS. In contrast to the sensor-centric approach, the mission-centric approach would in some cases passively receive data and in other instances actively take control of sensors for the specific mission-oriented data.
Data from global sensors, such as satellites, can be made broadly available or may be requested from national or regional managers. Local sensors have limited area coverage and are often used for self-protection or to detect enemy units; however, data from local sensors can be correlated with data from global systems. Therefore, it must be made available Ibid., p. 17. 22 This process is similar the COP management process described in the CJCSM 3115.01 and can be used to greatly enhance the quality of the COP.
employed to cover the same area, the more important centralized command becomes in conducting an effective search; however, as stated above local sensors are often used for selfprotection and tactical operators rely upon local sensors to provide local situational awareness. Competition for control of information creates a tension between the needs of the operational and tactical level commanders.
Advocates of system of systems envision a mission-centric approach where data customers can subscribe to information as needed from the Global Information Grid (GIG).
In this instance platforms are not provided with autonomous processing capability. This is, I would offer, a strategic level view of how to manage a COP. Dissenting opinion to the system of system/GIG view expresses concern that the needs of tactical level commanders are not met in that construct. 23 An alternate vision argues that tactical commanders must have an autonomous capability to process organic system data, as well as post information to the GIG. This vision is contained within U. is needed to exercise these responsibilities. The purpose of this mental drill is to recognize the different objectives and needs of the strategic, operational, and tactical commanders and bound these information needs to create a COP that supports their objectives, "rather than creating a C2 system that can transmit all the information that can be acquired."
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Recognition of the different levels of situational awareness required at each echelon will lead to a realization that the COP in each operations center will not be the same. The only thing common in the COP will be the data available for display. Additionally, this may serve to encourage each level of command to remain focused on their respective responsibilities and not succumb to the temptation to micromanage from the top, or to the belief that one has the big picture at the bottom.
To advance the understanding and value of the common operational picture it is necessary for the Services and the Combatant Commanders to look at Doctrine, Organization, Training and Personnel.
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Doctrine
There is a need to develop C4ISR doctrine to discipline the use and management of information technology. This doctrine needs to recognize that the information created and displayed on the COP isn't there merely to provide the commander with information to react to and spontaneously exercise control. At the operational level the COP should provide the commander with knowledge that allows him to validate his command concept and modify it accordingly when faults are discovered. The doctrine must also recognize that, while the data available on the COP is identical for all users, various commands displays of the COP will not be identical. As the data moves further from the battlespace and up the chain of command caution must be exercised to avoid assuming that identical conclusions as to the next coarse of action will be drawn from the COP. To gain maximum knowledge from the data the operational commander will still require context to properly interpret information.
To do this he will have to have direct human-to-human communication with lower echelons. 
Personnel
People are required to execute the doctrine and fill the billets in an organization that is responsible for developing a COP. There is a need for the Services, as the provider of trained forces, to develop a community of personnel skilled at information technology management. The revised CJCSI 3115, currently in the approval process, addresses the personnel issue and will show that there is a need for people with warfighter backgrounds to create the architectures, and manage/interpret the data on the COP.
Training
To ensure that the COP is accurate and timely the personnel charged with its management need to be trained. As discussed in the aviation analogy, to make use of technology requires people who understand how to operate the new system and how to make use of the system. In other works the personnel must know how to "fight the ship." It would 29 Chairman To ensure that the operational commander gets the situational awareness he desires the staffs of the services and the Combatant Commanders need to address doctrinal, personnel, training and organizational issues. Failure to do so will at best result in inefficiencies, and at worst could lead to serious misunderstandings in the battlespace.
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